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                                                    ABSTRACT  
                          
 
                         ELITES, POWER SOURCES AND DEMOCRACY 
                                                       
                                                   Deniz Yetkin 
                                      Political Science MA Thesis, 2008 
                                        Assistant Prof. Dr. Nedim Nomer 
 
 This thesis is about elites in general, and the acquisition and maintenance of 
power in particular. The last concern of the thesis is democracy. For this reason, the 
classical elite theorists’ and the democratic elite theorists’ perceptions of the elite were 
critically analyzed. Moreover, power for becoming a part of the elites and power of the 
elites were discussed. In addition to these discussions, ideas of classical and democratic 
elite theorists about the possibility of democracy under elite rule and the compatibility 
of it with the elite theory were questioned. This inquiry concluded that, according to 
elite theories there are elite groups in societies. They are powerful and prestigious. 
However, the power sources for becoming political elites and power sources of the 
elites are different from one elite theorist to another. Nevertheless, it was claimed that 
according to democratic elite theorists the power of elites can be restricted thanks to 
democracy. Furthermore, they argue that democracy is compatible with the theory of 
elite and it is possible to have democracy under the rule of the elites. Thus, chapter one 
was designed so as to provide a general view of classical elite theorists’ perception of 
elites. Chapter two provided the basic discussion between classical and democratic elite 
theorists about power sources and democracy.  
 
Keywords: Classical Elite Theories, Democratic Elite Theories, Elites, Power Sources, 
Power Scope of Elites.  
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                                                        ÖZET 
 
                      ELİTLER, GÜÇ KAYNAKLARI VE DEMOKRASİ 
 
                                                      Deniz Yetkin 
                                  Siyaset Bilimi Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2008 
                                          Yardımcı Doç. Dr. Nedim Nomer 
 
Bu tez genel olarak elitler, ancak özellikle güç kazanımı ve gücün elde tutulmasıyla 
ilgilidir. Tezi ilgilendiren bir diğer konu ise demokrasidir. Bu sebeple, klasik elit 
teorileri ve demokratik elit teorileri eleştrisel olarak analiz edilmiştir. Dahası, elit 
olabilmek için gerekli olan güç kaynakları ve elitlerin güç kaynakları tartışılmıştır. 
Bunlara ek olarak, klasik ve demokratik elite teorisyenlerinin elitlerin yönettiği 
demokrasi ihtimaline bakışları sorgulanmıştır. Bu çalışma, elite teorilerine göre 
toplumlarda elitlerin varolduğu sonucunu çıkarır. Bu elitler güçlü ve prestijlilerdir. 
Ancak, elit olabilmek için gerekli olan güç kaynakları ve elitlerin güç kaynakları farklı 
elit teorilerinde farklılık gösterir. Yinede, demokratik elit teorisyenlerine göre elitlerin 
güçleri demokrasilerde sınırlandırılabilir. Hatta, onlar için demokrasi fikri elit 
teorileriyle uyumludur ve elitlerin yönetici olduğu bir demokrasi olanaklıdır. Bu 
yüzden, birinci bölüm klasik elit teorisyenlerinin elitlere bakışını genel anlamda inceler. 
İkinci bölüm, klasik ve demokratik elit teorisyenlerinin güç kaynakları ve demokrasi 
hakkındaki tartışmaları üzerinde durur. 
 
Anahtar Sözcükler: Klasik Elit Teorileri, Demokratik Elit Teorileri, Elitler, Güç 
Kaynakları, Elitlerin Güçlerinin Kapsamı. 
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                                                      INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
 
 According to a well-established school of thought in political science, social and 
political phenomena can ultimately be explained in reference to the activities of a 
particular group of individuals, i.e. of elites. For example, Heper and Sayarı argue that 
‘politics revolve around political leaders,’ and political leaders have ‘an iron rule’ in 
their party policies.1 Many other scholars have shown that elites are one of the most 
important factors in the ruling of a society (e.g., Pareto 1935; Mosca 1939; Aron 1950; 
Castles 1974; Putnam 1976; Huntington 1984). 2  
  Thus, elites are defined as individuals who are able to affect political outcomes. 
For instance, according to Lijphart, democracies which have a consociational 
government by elite union require elites who are able to embrace the different interests 
and demands of subcultures. 3  Moreover, Rustow hypothesizes that democratization 
begins with inconclusive political struggle. After that, deliberate decision is made by 
elites ‘to accept the existence of diversity in unity.’ 4  In more recent studies of 
‘democratic breakdowns,’ such as the ones by Linz and Stepan (1978) it is argued that 
regime volatility is rooted in enduring elite disunity. O'Donnell and Schmitter show a 
recent attention toward the significance of elites and their alteration. They define an 
explicit elite pact. However, for them, this pact is not always publicly explicated or 
justified but it is an agreement among a set of actors. These actors or elites want to 
define (or to re-define) rules that are important for the exercise of power and that 
                                               
1
 Heper, Metin and Sabri Sayarı, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey, (Maryland: 
Lexington, 2002), vii. 
 
2
 Higley, John and Michael G. Burton. “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and 
Breakdowns,” American Sociological Review 54, no. 1 (1989), 18. 
 
3
 Lijphart, Arend. “Consociational Democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969), 216. 
 
4
 Wantchekon, Leonard. “The Paradox of "Warlord" Democracy: A Theoretical  Investigation,” 
The American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (2004), 29. 
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mutually guarantee the crucial interests of ‘those entering into it.’5 Last but not least, 
O'Donnell and Schmitter argue that transition to democracy is mostly caused by a 
separation between hardliners and soft liners, or between radicals and moderates.6 
 Such theories are best classified as ‘elite’ theories. While the origin of this type of 
theory could perhaps be traced back to Plato’s writings, it was Pareto who provided the 
most fruitful version of it for modern times. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasized that 
the word ‘elite’ was used in the seventieth century for expressing excellent supplies; 
later its meaning was broadened to describe social groups like ‘prestigious military units 
or the higher ranks of the nobility.’ For example, according to Oxford English 
Dictionary, the latter usage appeared in the English language in 1823.  
 Since late nineteenth century in Europe, and since the 1930s in Britain and 
America, the term was spread through the sociological theories of elites. 7  Now, 
according to the contemporary dictionary, ‘elite’ is the outstanding in society, army or 
like8; and the ones that generally signify any group of people who (whether or not 
knowingly) share positions of social or political privilege, or both. The term is also used 
for indicating a group of people who are in such a position where they see themselves 
‘as chosen, either by others or by nature, to lead or govern.’ 9   
 This idea of ‘elite’ sometimes includes the notion of leadership, and these words 
are mostly used interchangeably. However, there are some differences between them. 
First of all, leader is ‘the one who leads or conducts; one who occupies a chief or 
prominent place … to arouse, incite, and direct men in conduct, and achievement.’ 10 
Hence, the word ‘leader’ refers to individuals who are able to exercise power to 
mobilize humans for specific goals. The word ‘elite’ refers to a group of individuals 
holding privileged positions in society or organizations.   
                                               
5
 Higley, and Burton “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns,”  28. 
 
6
 O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian  Rule:   
Tentative  Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University, 1986), 15.  
 
7
 Bottomore, Tom, Elites and Society, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 1. 
 
8
 Funk, Isaak ed. New Standard Dictionary of the English Language. (New York:  Funk and 
Wagnals, 1961), 805. 
 
9
 Scruton, Roger ed,  The Palgrave Macmillan Dictionary of Political Thought, (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 205. 
 
10
 Funk, Isaak, New Standard Dictionary of the English Language, 1404. 
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 Thus, elites occupy higher positions in a hierarchy. They might have access to 
economic, military or political sources, and control them. However, ‘leadership’ has 
been preferred to ‘elite’ by most of the scholars over the last three decades. With the 
word leader, they refer to an actual exercise of power. Leaders use power on their 
followers. Between the leader and the followers, there is a dynamic relationship: in a 
situation of collective action, there are interactions between the two. Yet, there is almost 
no interaction between elites and non-elites. Finally, an individual belonging to an elite 
group may be advantageous over others due to his leadership role. This situation is 
fairly common; not every elite becomes a leader. On the other hand, in specific 
situations such as leadership in politics, all leaders have to be members of the elite, 
‘especially in times of revolutionary change.’11  
 Nevertheless, both the words ‘elite’ and ‘leader’ are used in modern political 
science. They identify people who are, for instance, central in a nation’s policy making 
process. However, in this thesis the basic concern is elites and the elite theories: all elite 
theories split societies into two groups, ‘majority and minority,’ where the majority is 
ruled by the minority. Since there is not a consensus among elite theories, I would like 
to divide them into two kinds: Elite theories of thinkers such as Pareto, Mosca, Michels 
and Wright Mills according to which political regimes have almost no differences 
among them and cannot limit the power scope of elites vs. elite theories of thinkers such 
as Sartori, Dahl and Schumpeter according to which democracy can limit the power of 
elites and hence, is possible under elite rule. 
 Still, the most popular categorization of elite theories is ‘classical (mainstream) 
elite theories vs. democratic elite theories’ 12  and I will use this categorization. In 
general, classical elite theorists view democracies as the regimes in which the occupants 
of power are the minority; and the majority has little power of its own. For this reason, 
classical elite theorists do not have much to say on what makes democracy a distinctive 
regime.13 Democratic elite theorists, however, argue that in democracies the members of 
                                               
11
 Fukai, Shigeko N. and Haruhiro Fukui, “Elite vs. Leader: Elite Recruitment and Political 
Leadership,” Political Science and Politics 25, no. 1 (1992), 25. 
 
12
 Etizoni-Halevy, Eva ed.,  Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization: A 
Collection of Readings, (New York: Garland Publishing, INC, 1997), xxx. 
 
13
 Hughes, H. Stuart, Consciousness and Society, (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 
2002), 44. 
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the majority are subject to the power of the minority, but they can still affect the elites, 
for instance, by selecting them from a larger group of elites.  
 Among classical elite theories, Pareto’s enjoys an important place since he first 
used the concept of elite and he has substantial amounts of writings on the subject. In 
his basic work ‘The Mind and Society,’ he both defines elite and deals with his theory 
of the ‘circulation of elites’ which is a political process. He argues that governing and 
non-governing elites, all of whom excel, rule the majority in principle.14 Other elite 
theorists in this group, such as Mosca, identify the governing elite as the ruling class 
and Michels as ‘dominant class.’ While Michels offers the famous ‘iron law of 
oligarchy’ which means that ‘society cannot exist without a dominant class,’ for both of 
them, there is an organized minority who rules the unorganized majority in every 
society.15 Additionally, C. Wright Mills argues that elites rule the society and some of 
these elites constitute ‘the power elite.’   
 In contrast, Shumpeter is the creator of democratic elite theories. According to 
him, elites are the minority ruling the society and entrepreneurs who create new 
demands thanks to their policies.16 For Dahl, the majority is homo civicus.  It consists of 
citizens who do not have any interest in politics. The minority is homo politicus who are 
interested in politics.17 Finally, Sartori believes that since in democracies there is no 
concentration of power, there is pluralism of elites.18 
 In the first chapter, I analyze the first group in order to have a profound 
understanding of the rulers in societies. In the second chapter, I evaluate some of the 
clues among the elite theories to understand how individuals become a part of the elite 
and how democracy is compatible with elite theory. In addition, I try to compare 
democratic and classical elite theories while I discuss democratic elite theorists’ ideas 
about elites, power sources and democracy. For instance, about the first power source, 
                                               
14
 Etizoni-Halevy, Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization, 43 and 50. 
 
15
 Ibid. 44. 
 
16
 Körösényi, András, “Political Representation in Leader Democracy,” Government and 
Opposition 40, no. 3 (2005), 367. 
 
17
 Sandhu, Amandeep, “Political Sociology in Light of Globalization: New Perspectives and 
Future Directions,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations 5, no.1-2 (2006),3. 
 
18
 Sartori, Giovanni, The Theory of Democracy Revisited: Part One, The Contemporary Debate, 
(New Jersey: Chatam House Publishers, Inc., 1987), 145. 
 
 5 
Pareto can be interpreted as the one who believes in talents. He argues that under any 
political regime people from non-elite with the proper qualities of excellence can 
become a member of the elite. The majority has to obey them. Conversely, Schumpeter 
who is a democratic elite theorist claims that although the elite minority rules the 
majority; in democracies, voters have limited control over the representatives.19 
 Nevertheless, theories of elites may not be the only ones that can reflect facts 
about the power relations in a society. There might be different determinants explaining 
power relations in different societies. Thus, as Michael Mann argues, each society may 
develop according to its own logic.20 Therefore, theories of elites may be insufficient in 
the study of power relations in different societies. For this reason, questioning whether 
one can separate an element of a society is an important issue.21 By remembering such 
difficulties, in this thesis, I concentrate on the elite theorists alongside historical and 
political affiliations. I give attention to the perspectives of ‘classical elite theorists’ such 
as Pareto, Mosca, Michels and Mills, and to the perspective of ‘democratic elite 
theorists’ such as Schumpeter, Sartori and Dahl. 
 To conclude, this thesis is about elites. It has the special endeavor to analyze elite 
theories and their perception of power in a comprehensive way. It can potentially be 
useful for the contemporary discussions about democracy since elite theories give 
explanations about who is important in democratic decision-making process, or who has 
power to govern in democracies.22 All in all, chapter one is designed so as to provide a 
general view of the elites in classical elite theories. Chapter two provides the basic 
discussion about elites’ power sources and elite power under democratic form of 
government. Besides, in chapter two possibility of democracy under elite rule is 
critically analyzed.  
  
 
 
 
                                               
19
 Etizoni-Halevy, Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization, 45. 
 
20
 Mann, Michael, The Sources of Social power: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, Vol.2, 
(United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 9. 
 
21
 Mann, Michael. The Sources of Social power: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 
1760. Vol.1 (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 3. 
 
22
 Etizoni-Halevy, Classes and Elites in Democracy and Democratization, xxii. 
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                                                CHAPTER ONE 
 
              THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ELITE DISCUSSION 
 
 Elite theory research is about power and influence. Elite theorists argue that 
societies can be divided into the few, whom they call elite, and the many. The elites 
have power and influence on ruling the many or on decision-making processes at 
different degrees. The many consists of non-elites who obey the elites and the decisions 
the elites make. Nevertheless, although elite theorists agree on some of these ideas; they 
can be divided into two schools of thought: Elite Theories that do not differentiate 
between political regimes (Classical or Mainstream Elite Theories) and those that do 
(Democratic Elite Theories). More specifically, democratic elite theorists do not agree 
with the classical elite theorists on the issue of political passivity of the majority. They 
claim that democracy is possible and compatible with theory of elites. Additionally, in 
democracies non-elites have some power and influence on the decision-making 
process.23  
 In this chapter I will discuss only the ‘classical’ group, that is, the theories of 
Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, and Gaetano Mosca who are the first and the most 
famous classical elite theorists24; as well as C. Wright Mills who is a contemporary 
follower of these elite theorists. The basic question that will guide this chapter is: who 
are the rulers? This part is intended to emphasize the most famous classical elite 
theories. 
 
 
 
                                               
23
 Arslan, Ali, “Elite and Power in Contemporary Turkey in the Context of the EU,” Entelequia, 
revista interdisciplinar, no.2, (2006), 218. 
 
24
 Vergin, Nur, Siyasetin Sosyolojisi: Kavramlar, Tanımlar, Yaklaşımlar, (Istanbul: Bağlam 
Yayınları, 2007), 111. 
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1.1    MACHIAVELLI AND HIS FOLLOWERS  
 
 
 Machiavelli is perhaps the most important of the classical elite theorist to 
understand, since all classical elite theorists, in one way or another, are followers of 
Machiavelli. They are, in other words, the Machiavellians. The reason that the theorists 
can be referred to as such is that their theories conform to his basic idea, which is 
divorcing politics from a particular kind of ethics in order to have value-free theories. 
Such theories do not contain subjective value judgment.  
 Before Machiavelli, the prevailing view was that the governments must distribute 
justice. However, Machiavelli believes that the law of life under which every political 
organization exists is growth and virtue, especially with force. Thus, force was an 
integral and essential element in politics.25 Therefore, politics is primarily a study of the 
struggle for power among men.26 For this reason, he aims to separate politics from 
ethics; then to locate those politics in a world which is real and can be known. This is an 
important innovation by Machiavelli, effectively separating politics from transcendental 
or other-worldly ethics.27  
 In order to realize his aim, Machiavelli analyzes things (such as historical events 
or social phenomena) to find facts (uniformities in these events and phenomena). 
Machiavelli gleans these facts from historical works and from his experiences during 
his political career.28 This method is followed by classical elite theorists who try to 
show ‘what it is but not what ought to be’ for having value-free political theories.29 For 
                                               
25
 Edward, Paul et. al., The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol 5-6, (New York: Macmillan and 
Free Press, 1967), 120. 
 
26
 Burnham, James, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom, (London: Putnam and 
Company Limited, 1943), 29. 
 
27
 Ibid. 28. 
 
28
 Ibid. 30. 
 
29
 For instance, according to Pareto, Aristotle discusses what a city ought to be rather than what 
it is in his work ‘Politics.’ Pareto, Vilfredo, The Mind and Society, Vol. 1, Ed. Kenneth 
Thompson, The Early Sociology of Culture, Vol. 3 (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 
181. 
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the same reason, the Machiavellians, such as Pareto30, derive some of their facts from 
historical works. 
 Thirdly, Machiavelli and his followers argue that active political struggle is 
limited to minority of men31 who want to increase their power and privilege.32 Thus, 
Machiavelli and the Machiavellians claim that humans can be divided into two groups:  
the minority (rulers) and the majority (ruled), which reflects the basic facts of political 
life.33 The majority cannot join the political struggle, and they always obey the decision-
makers. Therefore, according to Machiavellians, the most important characteristic of the 
majority is their political passivity, unless there are exceptional circumstances. For 
instance, if there is extreme irritation toward the rulers, then the ruled could become 
interested in power. Otherwise, the ruled want only a small amount of security, as well 
as a chance to live their own lives, and manage their own small affairs. As a result, they 
have a great respect for firm authority.34  
 To conclude, Machiavelli will always have followers. There has been widespread 
improvement of Machiavelli’s ideas with the help of deliberation and research done by 
a number of writers. These writers try to have value-free theories by analyzing things 
(such as historical events or social phenomena) to find facts. Additionally, they insist on 
the majority and its political passivity. 
 
 
1.2 THE CLASSICAL ELITE THEORISTS: 
 
    1.2.1    Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) and the ‘Governing Elite:’  
 
 To understand Pareto’s elite theory, his reactions to science and sociology must 
first be understood: Pareto is upset about sociology before him.35 For instance, in the 
19th century, beliefs about social and material progress, human perfectibility, and 
                                               
30  Pareto, The Mind and Society, Vol. 1, 87. 
 
31 Burnham, The Machiavellians, 38. 
 
32 Ibid. 30. 
 
33 
 Ibid. 37. 
 
34
 Ibid. 38. 
 
35
 Ibid. 26.  
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positivism 36  are dominant. 37  So far, almost all thinkers talk about laws in their 
respective fields of study, such as scientific laws, historical laws, or sociological laws. 
According to them, these laws exist outside and independently of the observer. Some of 
these laws are the laws of Euclidean geometry and Marx’s dialectical law of social 
evolution.38 However, some anomalies occur in their laws in the end of the 19th century. 
For example, contrary to liberal democratic theories, political institutions of liberal 
democratic states start to disintegrate.39  
 Therefore, by the end of the 19th century, Pareto (as well as other classical elite 
theorists such as Mosca and Michels) attacks theories of progress, perfectibility, and 
positivism. Pareto questions how people can know that what scientists call laws are 
really laws40 and he starts to criticize these laws. According to him, both in social 
science and natural science there should be logico-experimental (experiments in a 
logical manner) but not non-logico-experimental (experiments in a non-logical manner) 
theories. However, Pareto argues that 19th century positivism is pseudo-positivism, thus, 
it is claimed to be positivism but actually it includes non-logico-experimental theories.   
 Logico-experimental theory is analyzing things to find facts. Moreover, it is about 
finding out regular relations between facts41 and questioning whether the proposition is 
in accord with experience. 42  For instance, according Pareto, principles should be 
abstract propositions that summarize the traits common to many different facts. This 
means that principles should depend on facts, but not the facts on the principles. Only in 
                                               
36
 ‘…We must confine ourselves to what is given to us in sense-experience as sources of 
KNOWLEDGE. Thus positivism rejects all metaphysical speculations and abstract theorizing, 
and even a critical examination of its own presuppositions…Thus the positivist sees his task in 
finding the general principles of science starting from experience. In this it is related to the 
generally empirical temper of the sciences as seeking to proceed by observation and 
experiment.’ Vesey, G. and P. Foulkes. Collins Dictionary of Phiosophy. (Great Britain: Harper 
Collins Pubs., 1990), 229.    
 
37
 Pareto, Vilfredo, Sociological Writings, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), 
3. 
 
38
 Ibid. 6.  
 
39
 Ibid. 4-5. 
 
40
  Ibid. 6. 
 
41
 Pareto, The Mind and Society, Vol. 1, 118. 
 
42
 Ibid. 11. 
 
 10 
this situation, can they ‘hypothetically’ be accepted. Once principles are not in 
agreement with the facts and the laws of logic; then they should be rejected. The reason 
is that even in natural sciences laws can be known within the limits of time and space. 
There is no necessity in them43 since they are only experimental uniformities.44 
 For example, an engineer constructs bridges (fact). After he knows his aims, he 
studies the characteristics of his resources (facts), and calculates approximately his 
means-end relationship. In the end, he actualizes his means-end relationship as he 
planned in his mind.45 However, as a result of such regular relations among facts, the 
engineer should simply observe these uniformities without believing that there is a 
necessity in these regular relations.46 Then, this can be experimental science which is 
established in logical manner.  
 
a) Logical and Non-Logical Conduct:  
 
 
 Pareto observes humans’ actions47 and classifies them as logical vs. non-logical. If 
an action is objective then it is logical, otherwise non-logical. 48  Thus, man should 
analyze things to find facts. As a result, if his behavior is motivated intentionally for 
having a goal which is possible with the steps or ways that are appropriate for realizing 
this behavior, then it is logical. Logical acts depend on human reason. Beside science 
and economics, Pareto believes that there are logical acts in the arts, military, politics 
and crafts as well.49 However, for elite discussion individuals’ non-logical actions are 
fundamental. Pareto argues that humans want others to see all of their behavior as 
logical as in the previous engineer’s example; but according to him, sociology should 
                                               
43
 Pareto, The Mind and Society, Vol. 1, 51.  
 
44
 Ibid. 52. 
 
45
 Ibid. 110. 
 
46
 Ibid. 119. 
 
47
 Ibid. 75. 
 
48
 Ibid. 77. 
 
49
 Ibid. 78. 
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demonstrate that they also have non-logical behaviors. 50  The reason is that human 
behaviors are determined by sentiments more than reasons and that sentiments are not 
bound by the laws of logic.51  
 Pareto points to four ways in which the non-logicality of human actions manifests 
itself. According to him, these are the four key categories of non-logical actions, and 
they represent subject of the Treatise on General Sociology (The Mind and Society): 
1. Taboos and superstitious acts (such as assigning some value to certain numbers like 
number thirteen carrying bad luck) can be examples of humans’ non-logical actions 
which seem natural to humans; but those which do not necessarily have a point that can 
be understood rationally.52 However, Pareto believes that such actions are rare because 
man is a ‘reasoner’ and he tries to appoint his absurd actions a reason.53  
2. If an action carries a purpose which is impossible, then this kind of action is also non-
logical. 54  Such an action’s result is not logically connected to the aim the actor 
imagines.55 According to Pareto, this type of non-logical action is very widespread. For 
instance, if a goal is a transcendent one; that is, if someone wants to find life outside of 
the real spatio-temporal world then this is, scientifically, impossible. Knowing 
something about heaven or God, and reaching to a universal good will or universal 
consensus in a democracy 56  are some examples of non-logical behaviors.57   
3. Some actions produce a result which is logically connected to the means employed 
but which is not related to the actor’s imagined means-end relation.58 Thus, sometimes 
the purpose of an action is impossible; although the action itself could result in a 
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desirable end after the actor stopped to think about it. These kinds of actions are non-
logical, since in logical action the formal and the real goals should be identical. This 
category includes all behaviors ordered by illusions, especially ‘the illusions of political 
men or intellectuals.’59 An important example could be trying to limit rulers’ power 
scope with the help of democracy. 
4. Finally, an action is non-logical if the way to reach the goal is badly chosen.60 For 
instance, making an effort to pound nails with a sponge would be non-logical action of a 
carpenter because his means is inappropriate for his end, or democratic electorate’s 
beliefs about changing incumbent parties by voting is non-logical since they might be 
guaranteed an era of endless success.61  
 Pareto’s sociology follows two paths by making observations and by using logico-
experimental method: one is the inductive path, and the other is deductive path.62 The 
inductive path is about realizing non-logical actions and these key categories; the 
deductive path is about establishing a classification of residues that are expression of 
sentiments and principal causes of non-logical actions.63 The first path is important for 
understanding why elite theory is valid under each political regime; the second path is 
important for explaining the elite theory.  
 In the second path, Pareto argues that there is always a constant and variable 
element in human phenomena and in the theories which try to explain them. The 
constant element (residue) is the expression of mental state (psychology), for instance, 
instincts, feelings, and desires. The variable element (derivations) is formed by logical 
and non-logical reasoning that express the need for justification in a rational way.64  
Thus, according to Pareto, residue is a sociological term which is stable, represents 
mostly human desires, and leads humans to have non-logical actions. He calls them 
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sentiments.65 However, since Pareto uses the term ambiguously, I argue that according 
to him, residues are not only sentiments but also states of mind which are intermediary 
among the sentiments, expressions and acts. Moreover, although residues are related to 
humans’ instincts, they do not cover up all their instincts. The reason is that his theory 
of residues provides to discover only the instincts that cause rationalizations.66  
Thus, Pareto uses residues and derivations as analytic concepts created by the 
observer to explain observable facts for inductive analysis. This analysis begins with 
concrete data, such as human behaviors; and by repeated analysis, the expression of 
emotions is found. This expression is residues and different pseudo-rational 
formalizations (different non-logical actions) are derivations.67  
 
b) Residues and Derivations:    
 
 
 Almost all non-verbal actions of animals and humans are non-logical. Words are 
distinctive elements between animals and humans. Pareto focuses on non-logical actions 
which contain or which are related with words in order to find their reasons. He argues 
that there are vast numbers of examples of verbal non-logical actions which belong to 
different time, places and cultures. However, constant elements of these examples are 
small in number, and Pareto calls these constant elements as residues. In addition to that, 
factors that change rapidly from example to example are called derivations.68  
 For reaching these arguments, he studies for instance humans’ expressions, 
religious love, and practices of magic. These are the things that Pareto analyzes to find 
facts. Thus, he uses logico-scientific method and concludes that although these things 
differ on the surface from culture to culture;69 as a result of careful tests it can bee seen 
that they actually have a certain consistency. For instance, as it was stated before, 
humans from the most different civilizations assigning some value to certain numbers 
like number thirteen carrying bad luck can be an example of non-logical action. The 
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reason of such a behavior is that in every society there is a constant element (residue) 
which is humans’ tendency to relate things or numbers with some connotations.70 The 
variable element (derivation) of such non-logical action is various implications to justify 
the means-end relations.71 More clearly, relating numbers with bad luck is a derivation; 
or talents with privilege is a derivation in order to justify the idea of being elite. In these 
situations, the constant element (residue) is combination. 
There are six classes of residues which function in social action.72 I think that the 
first two classes are the main ones and the others can be derived from them. The first 
class is called ‘Instinct for Combination.’73 According to Pareto, some instincts lead 
humans to unite various elements that they have found, arbitrarily, with the help of their 
personal experiences.74 For instance, he argues that good in his time is believed as 
‘democratic’ or progressive; and everything evil is believed as ‘aristocratic.’75 Desire to 
control the weather can be a derivation of this residue. For instance, some tribes explain 
controlling ability of weather with superficial powers and certain activities. They 
sacrifice a certain animal, or repeat certain formulas. According to them these practices 
provide to control weather since they comfort gods.  
All such different practices and explanatory theories are derivations.76 However, 
although many nations, tribes or groups have had such theories and practices; in 
different times, there is a common nucleus which is the feeling to merge desires with 
some acts. After understanding the nucleus, the fact can be seen: in many other types of 
activities, men combine with whatever means for whatever purpose or for no purpose at 
all. This nucleus is the residue and called the ‘Instinct for Combinations.’77   
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 The second class of residues is opposite of the first class. Pareto calls it 
‘Persistence of Aggregation.’78 This class is about forces which come to play after 
combination has been formed. Additionally, it is about humans’ beliefs that are related 
with ‘objective reality and persistence of entities’ like family, progress, and justice.79 
These forces and beliefs try to make a combination be stable and persisting.80 That is, 
they try to stick with uniformities.81 Although the first class (Instinct for Combination) 
is about progressive forces, this second class (Persistence of Aggregation) is about 
obscurant ones. Family can be an example:82 as a result of the fact that humans have 
partners and children, the idea of family is formed. This combination could be counted 
as a progress. However, after this combination many people start to see it as a 
permanent and objective entity. Other examples can be seeing class, harmony, 83 
democracy,84 universal consensus,85  and faith.86  
 Although all other residues can fall into these two classes; Pareto continues with 
them:87 The third one, ‘Need of Expressing Sentiments by External Acts,’88 is related 
with needs of expressing sentiments. 89  The fourth one, ‘Residues Connected with 
Sociality’90 underlines humans’ need to feel conformity with the group that they belong 
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to.91 Social ranking, class uniformity and hierarchy are some examples (derivations) of 
this class. 92  Moreover the fifth residue, ‘Integrity of the Individual and His 
Appurtenances,’93  is about guarding one’s personal integrity by keeping things and 
conditions that he identifies himself and by having strong feeling against changes in the 
social structure.94 Finally, sex residue is about mere sexual appetite. There are various 
examples in different societies,95 such as different sexual taboos.96 
 All in all, humans are influenced mainly by sentiments (residues). 97  Pareto 
believes that non-logical actions are caused by a number of residues. The right of 
people,98 reason, nature, the highest good, democracy, and humanity are some examples 
(derivations) to such indistinct incoherent sentiments.99  
 
c)    The Elites:  
 
 
 On the basis of this account of sentiments and thus of ‘residues,’ Pareto constructs 
his theory of elites: With the inductive path of his sociology, Pareto observes humans 
behaviors and argues that some behaviors are logical but some are not. The cause of 
logical actions is human reason. However, the cause of non-logical actions is mostly 
human mental state. There are residues by which humans derive certain acts, laws and 
customs. In addition to that, Pareto argues that human beings physically, morally, and 
intellectually differ from one another. 100  As a result, for example, instinct for 
combination (Class 1 residue) forces individuals to combine their differences with some 
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important roles in groups. Thus, they combine the highest talent with the right to have 
prestige and privileged positions in a group. The residue of interest of combinations 
allows physically or intellectually superior individuals to form and rule a society. As a 
result, in societies there are elites and non-elites. Nevertheless, this is a non-logical 
action.101  
 Most importantly in Pareto’s theory, talent is a value-free term. For him, a talented 
individual has highest score ‘in scales measuring…power, riches, knowledge.’102 Pareto 
says  
‘Let us assume that in every branch of human activity each individual is given 
an index which stands as a sign of his capacity, very much the way grades are 
given in the various subjects in examinations in school. The highest type of 
lawyer, for instance, will be given 10. The man who does not get a client will be 
given1--reserving zero for the man who is an out-and-out idiot. To the man who 
has made his millions--honestly or dishonestly as the case maybe--we will give 
10. To the man who has earned his thousands we will give 6; to such as just 
manage to keep out of the poor-house, 1, keeping zero for those who get in. To 
the woman "in politics," such as the Aspasia of Pericles, the Maintenon of Louis 
XIV, the Pompadour of Louis XV, who has managed to infatuate a man of 
power and play apart in the man's career, we shall give some higher number, 
such as 8or 9; to the strumpet who merely satisfies the senses of such a man and 
exerts no influence on public affairs, we shall give zero. To clever rascal who 
knows how to fool people and still keep clear of the penitentiary, we shall give 8, 
9, or 10, according to the number of geese he has plucked and the amount of 
money he has been able to get out of them. To the sneak-thief who snatches a 
piece of silver from a restaurant table and runs away into the arms of a 
policeman, we shall give 1.To a poet like Carducci we shall give 8 or 9according 
to our tastes; to a scribbler who puts people to rout with his sonnets we shall 
give zero.’ 103 
 
 As a result of this method, Pareto calls a group of the people ‘elites’ who have the 
highest scores in their branch of activity.104 These elites are minority of a society but 
they rule and influence the whole society. Their high scores separate them from the 
general public and provide to cluster them into higher classes.105 For instance, if stealing 
is an accepted and appreciated social norm in a society; then thieves will be ranked 
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higher than non-thieves, and stealing will be the determining factor for higher social 
rank in a society.106  
 Elites are divided into the governing elite and the non-governing elite.107 Others 
are the governed (the majority) who do not have high measure of talents. Governing 
elite is formed by superior individuals who have required talents for taking a part in 
government. They have highest power in decision-making process.108 Otherwise, if an 
individual does not have characteristics that governing elite requires, then although he 
might have high scores; he cannot be one of governing elite. Pareto exemplifies 
‘We are speaking; remember, of an actual, not a potential, state. If at an 
English examination a pupil says: "I could know English very well if I chose to; 
I do not know any because I have never seen fit to learn," the examiner replies: 
"I am not interested in your ability. The grade for what you know is zero." If, 
similarly, someone says: "So-and-so does not steal, not because he couldn't, but 
because he is a gentleman," we reply: "Very well, we admire him for his self-
control, but his grade as a thief is zero.’ 109 
 
 Moreover, according to Pareto all governing elites are not identical since among 
them there can be a small part which represents a smaller group (a leader, or a 
committee) that ‘effectively and practically exercise control.’110 Nevertheless, this ruler 
vs. ruled distinction will not change from one society to another irrespective of their 
political regime. 111   Only the openness of elites’ group can change. 112  This idea is 
related with Pareto’s theory of circulation of elites.  
 The most obvious way of elite circulation happens by death. Members of the elite 
suffer from attrition over the years and they are replaced by the younger generation who 
has the necessary talents.113 For instance, after some governing elites died, talented non-
governing elites (lower rank among elites) or non-elites (lowest rank in society) can 
                                               
106
 Burnham, The Machiavellians,152. 
 
107
 Pareto, The Mind and Society, Vol 3, 1423. 
 
108
 Ibid. 1424. 
 
109
 Ibid.1423. 
 
110
 Pareto, Vilfredo, The Mind and Society, Vol. 4. Ed. Kenneth Thompson, The Early Sociology 
of Culture, Vol. 6 (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 1575. 
 
111
 Pareto, Sociological Writings,14. 
 
112
 Ibid. 51.  
 
113
 Pareto, The Mind and Society, Vol. 4, 1787. 
 19 
become governing elites.114 However the elite as a historical grouping (group of rentiers 
or speculators) would not be damaged by this circulation; only individuals will 
change.115 In a second way, which is revolution, the lowest stratum of society tends to 
supersede old elites and to accumulate new superior abilities116 which are constrained 
and prevented from vertical movement by old elites. The highest stratum, for instance 
the aristocracy or elite, tends to lose its ability due to lack of use. This can lead to 
tensions and replacement of governing elite by another who is more talented (for that 
particular society).117 
 Relationship between the governing elite and the governed is settled in a way 
where Class 1 (instinct for combination) and Class 2 (persistence of aggregates) 
residues are distributed.118 For example, if governing elites are dominated by Class 1 
residue then they ‘tend to be mercantile materialistic, innovatory;’ and they rule by 
guile. However, if governing elites are dominated by Class 2 residue then they ‘tend to 
be bureaucratic, idealistic, and conservative;’ and they rule by force. The first ones are 
called foxes (speculators) and the second ones are called lions (rentiers).119  
 The distribution of lions and foxes in the society are different from time to time 
and from place to place. If governing elites are dominated by Class 1 residue (that is, if 
the governing elite is composed of lions) and Class 2 residue increase among the ruled; 
then the governing elite will lose its natural tendency to use force. An example is 
provided by Pareto: athens in antiquity represents a state with a big proportion of Class I 
residues. The interesting point is unexpected large proportion of Class I in the non-elite 
portion of this society. For him, usually Class II type of individuals dominates non-elite, 
but in Athens opposite was the case. This situation led to incredible success of Athens 
and fast pace of social change. Adventure and innovation was welcomed by every strata 
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of society and they dominated every aspect of life including politics and the 
economy.120  
 In all of these arguments, Pareto assumes a perfect competition which dominates 
selection of elites in a society. He argues that this provides free circulation between the 
rulers and the ruled. For him, free circulation is the only way to maintain social 
equilibrium and well-being of the individuals in a society.121 However, such a perfect 
competition and examples like Athens are rather rare in reality, and Pareto is aware of it. 
Nevertheless as scientists that he criticizes, Pareto obstructs the free competition 
assumption by ‘ties,’ and he does not change his whole theory in spite of the anomaly. 
These ties, especially in the second way of circulation, prevent individuals from moving 
upwards when their abilities allow them to do so and from moving downwards when 
they are not fit to be in the ruling elite.  
 For instance, the obvious and most common obstacle against upward social 
mobility is the institution of aristocracy. All aristocrats can be a member of governing 
elite. This is their birth right. Individual characteristics are irrelevant for them to obtain 
this position, but some personal ties are important. As a result, if this is strictly enforced 
and if there is very little mobility in the society, then the ruling elite will degenerate. 
Less able and less talented people will dominate the governing elite and more able and 
more talented people will be among the ruled.122  
 Finally, in politics Pareto argues that governing elites mostly identify their own 
interests with the ‘interest of the country.’123 Although this would be harmful and non-
logical for a society, it is just logically consistent with their interest.124 A society is not a 
person and should not be confused with a person; therefore, it cannot have a scale of 
preferences. There are many individuals or groups in societies with different hierarchies 
of preferences. Thus, ‘Social Utility’ is complex and imprecise concept. For this reason, 
rulers’ act of identifying their own interests with the interest of the country is a non-
logical action. 
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 To conclude, first two classes of residues that describe sentiments causing non-
logical actions are the most important classes for Pareto’s sociological theory and 
theory of elite.125 According to him, all societies are ruled by elites. Most of these elites 
have natural abilities in forming societies and doing various social activities.126 I argue 
that his theory of elite emphasizes inequality of individual innate gifts that provide 
special advantages in different spheres of social life.127 The reason he gives is humans’ 
mental state which force them to combine talent with prestige. This is a ‘psychological 
approach’ to elite theory and he discusses it in ‘The Mind and Society.’  
 This work is unsystematic, but includes historical and comparative investigations 
of human social conduct. All in all, Pareto cannot explain his ideas about residues and 
derivations systematically and cannot answer questions such as why humans choose to 
make derivations, or how sentiments differ from interests.128 Thus, his theory should let 
him to answer philosophical questions about the nature of logic, but he has problems to 
answer them.129  
  
  
                      1.2.2  Gaetano Mosca (1858- 1941) and the ‘Ruling Class:’ 
 
 Mosca is one of the elite theorists and followers of Machiavelli who believes that 
‘even today political science has not yet entered upon its truly scientific period.’ The 
reason is that political scientists lack the talent to see the ‘great complexity of the 
phenomena involved in that subject.’130  By using Pareto’s logico-scientific method, he 
argues that the ruling elites and their circulation are the basic characteristic of politically 
organized societies. Mosca outlines his ideas deeply in his major work, Elementi di 
scienza politica (The Ruling Class).131 Many different problems are discussed in this 
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work such as problems in philosophy of history; however, the central discussion in it is 
the ‘political class,’ or ‘ruling class.’  
 According to him, in every politically organized society there is an organized 
minority that rules and influences the majority.132 The minority can rule the majority 
since it consists of superior people who have organization capability and create 
organizations of elites with similar talents. Additionally, since it is a small group it can 
be organized.133 Thus, Mosca has an organizational approach where elites are organized 
according to their capacities and rule the whole society because they are superior, small 
in number and organized (which is a circular idea and does not explain the issue in 
detail).  
 By minority, he refers, I believe, to those few who constitute the ruling class. All 
elites can influence and rule a society but the ruling class is more powerful group in 
decision-making process. For Mosca, although in every society there are elites and 
ruling class; some qualities, superiorities and functions that characterize the members of 
elites or ruling class can differ from one society to another.134 For instance, in some 
societies where physical strength is important then physically powerful people organize 
the elite group. In some other societies, economic functions are important determinant; 
therefore owners of important companies constitute the ruling class.135  
 Mosca gives some examples for explaining such superiorities of ruling class. 
According to him, becoming a member of ruling class happens through the use of 
violent means. Thus, coercion is the most common way to become a ruler. In advanced 
societies, intellectual capacities, and a perceived concern for the state’s interest can also 
lead individuals to ruling positions.136 As a result, it can be argued that for Mosca being 
a part of the ruling class requires different qualities (skills or talents) in different 
societies. If fishing is the best way to sustain oneself in a particular society, then fishing 
expertise might provide necessary conditions in that society.137  However, if one of 
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social forces -which is dominant in a society- declines (i.e. fishing or religion), then ‘the 
section of the ruling class whose position was dependent upon control of religion 
likewise, over a period, declines.’ 138  The declining force causes elite or ruling class to 
circulate if the latter does not improve its talents. 
 Finally, unlike classical Marxist idea in which -roughly- organization of economy 
leads the ruling class to derive,139 Mosca claims that the ruling class can derive also 
from different qualities, functions or talents other than organization of economy. For 
instance, in modern societies Mosca argues that a great part of the ruling class is always 
the bureaucrats who are salaried officials and who derive from organized bureaucracy 
related with ‘administration of the machinery of political, economic, and social life.’  
 To conclude, Mosca has an organizational approach to the elite theory, and argues 
that every society is ruled by an elite group. 140  He thinks that some people have 
organization capability and come together in terms of the ability that seems valuable in 
a society. They are organized because they are small in number. However, he does not 
explain his notion of organization deeply. Additionally, both Pareto and Mosca maintain 
that in all societies there are those who govern and those who are governed. However, 
there is a significant difference: In Pareto’s elite theory, there is a simple conflict 
between the governing elites who have power and the non-elites who do not. Gaetano 
Mosca borrows this conflict and makes a systematic distinction between the elite and 
the masses in terms of power, influence and organizations of elites.141 This systematic 
distinction is an important step to Robert Michels’ theory of elites.  
 
1.2.3 Robert Michels (1876-1936) and the ‘Dominant Class:’  
 
 Robert Michels is another follower of Machiavelli and one of the important 
classical elite theorists. Although it is mostly criticized that some of his works, for 
instance on political parties, on forms and functions of power, on influence, leadership, 
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bureaucracy, and on ruling elites in modern societies are not sufficient and sophisticated 
then those of other classical elite theorists;142 his ideas about socialism, working-class 
and socialist organizations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are 
worthwhile to read and discuss. Nevertheless in this thesis, his ideas about elites in 
societies are presented. 
 Michels’ famous book is called Zur Soziologie des Parteiwessens in der 
modernen Demokratie (translated as Political Parties). In this work he wants to have a 
value-free theory 143  since, like Mosca and Pareto, he has a reaction to science. 
Moreover, Michels is upset about sociology before him. The reason is that, according to 
him, there are simplistic and superficial illusions which cause dilemmas in science and 
which make the masses have false belief, such as the idea of democracy.144 Michels 
wants to destroy some of them. His effort is very much like Vilfredo Pareto and 
Gaetano Mosca since all of them claim that masses believe mistakenly in the possibility 
or the actuality of a majority that can rule society.  
 Michels gives careful examples from the history of European working-class, 
socialist parties and organizations. He argues that ‘organization implies the tendency to 
oligarchy.’145 Thus, in every group of people (in each organization) there is an elite 
group which is the organized minority. For instance, in societies there are political 
parties. In these organizations rulers are always a small organized minority but the ruled 
is always a great unorganized majority.  
 As a result, Michels proposes his famous law which is ‘iron law of oligarchy.’ He 
thinks that the dominant class is a necessary phenomenon in every form of political 
regimes146 and oligarchy is inevitable in societies.147 Michels calls the ruling class a 
‘dominant class.’ Similar to Mosca, he has an organizational approach to the theory of 
elite, and he argues that different qualities, superiorities and functions, such as military 
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or economic qualities, characterize the members of the dominant class in different 
societies. 
 Michels is strongly influenced by Marxist conception of social class and class 
struggle between the proletariat and bourgeoisie. However, for him, even if there would 
be two classes, proletariats (working class) and bourgeoisie,148 some of them would 
constitute the dominant class. Moreover, he argues that even if some day proletariat 
could be in power; a dominant class would derive from proletariat. Thus, the working 
class elites who are organized and form the dominant class would rule the majority.  
 Hence, Michels argues that there is a struggle only among successively dominant 
minorities. This struggle is about replacing the old ruling minority by a new one. For 
instance, the proletariat can create its own oligarchy by having a dominant class (elites) 
in its organizations. It can resemble the dominant class of the bourgeoisie.149 However 
unlike Pareto or Mosca and their ideas about circulation of elites, Michels does not 
mean that the dominant class is necessarily superseded by another.  Rather, he thinks 
that new ruling elites tend to make a coalition with the existing ruling group on which 
they often have important effects.150  
 All in all, these are the classical elite theorists; and as a result of their 
reaction to science and sociology they formulate the theory of elite. Their method is 
scientific sociology by controlling its concepts with the help of empirical reference. 
These theorists also want to have inferences that follow logic from empirical data.151 
The reason is that according to Pareto, Mosca and Michels it is possible to have an 
objective political science and sociology by testing the statements with facts that are 
accessible to any observer. Therefore explanations and theories about rich or poor, and 
ruler or ruled will not depend on ‘the acceptance of some ethical aim or ideal.’152  
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1.2.4 C. Wright Mills (1916-1962)  and ‘ The Power Elite:’ 
 
 
 Wright Mills’ major work about the elites is ‘The Power Elite.’ According to 
some critics, his theories are still relevant in today’s society.153 For him, politics is about 
struggle for power.154 He agrees with the Machiavellians and argues that societies are 
ruled by a minority (elites). In his work, he analyzes ruled majority and ruler minority. 
According to him, the ordinary people do not govern and they cannot influence 
decision-making process irrespective of different forms of government. For this reason, 
he can be considered a classical elite theorist.  
 Mills thinks that ‘as the means of information and of power are centralized, some 
men come to occupy positions in American society from which they can look down 
upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily affect, the everyday worlds of 
ordinary men and women.’155 That is, there is a ruling minority which affects life of the 
majority. This ruling minority is dominant since it centralizes power and information 
through institutions. Thus, Mills has an institutional approach to elite theory. The rulers 
are the elites who are composed of men in institutions of military, political and 
economic and who can ‘transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary men and 
women…’156  
 From Mosca, Mills borrows the idea of different elite groups (such as military 
elites). According to Mills, they depend on different institutions but in Mosca they have 
different talents; therefore different organizations. From Michels, he borrows the 
possibility not to replace one elite group by another. In Mills theory, different elite 
groups from different institutions can cooperate and form the power elite. However on 
some issues he does not agree with the followers of Machiavelli. For instance, although 
the Machiavellians believe that there is one harmonized elite group at one point in time; 
by taking the United States as an example Mills argues that there are different elite 
groups simultaneously in military, politics and economic corporations.157 They form 
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military elites, political elites, and business elites respectively without replacing each 
other. These elites sometimes come together and form ‘the power elite’ of USA.158 
Additionally, unlike Mosca, Mills thinks that words such as ‘ruling class’ cannot 
describe the ruling elite since class is an economical construct and rule is a political 
concept but for instance, the power elite includes military connotations as well.159 
 For Mills, although the instituted elite groups are often in tension, they collaborate 
on certain overlapping points and on certain time of crisis.160 Wars can make them 
collaborate. For instance, politicians are influenced by the military and decide to go war. 
During time of war, business companies gain some benefits because of military 
expenses.161 The military gains funds for improvement of armaments with the help of 
business companies. This triangle of power162 (the power elites) can be analyzed only at 
times when these three sets coincide. The reason is that the power elite are shaped by 
the interest matches of powerful elites of economy, politics, and military. As a result, 
Mills neither claims that the real power belongs to the government and the military 
elites, nor insists that business controls the society. Mills claims that elites’ institutions 
do not provide unilateral power163 to elites. They interact and result in the power elite. 
This power elite is accountable in the decision-making process 
 Mills analyses the history of the U.S. and argues that in the nineteenth century, 
neither the military nor the economic men were effective in the high ruling body of state 
(the power elite). 164 Although they sometimes interfered with the state; they could not 
join its directorate. During the thirties, however, the elites from the military and the 
corporate men affect decision making process. The elites of the military, politics and 
business corporations shape the power elite.165 Finally, Mills argues that among these 
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different groups of elites the military benefits the most in its superior power; the 
professional politician loses the most due to the other groups of elites’ gains.166 
 Although this means that elites from different institutions in the power elite 
interact and this interaction result in power to rule the society; neither groups nor the 
power elite have absolute power. 167  Similar to Machiavelli who points out the 
importance of luck,168  or Pareto, who stresses the importance of external forces; Mills 
states that humans are not able to direct the outside forces which are causes of everyday 
events. Some of these forces are history, weather and luck.169 For example, the elites of 
one of the biggest companies in California could loose their power and place in the 
power elite. The reason could be a major natural disaster such as an earthquake that 
damages the whole company. 170  Thus, the elites are ‘neither omnipotent nor 
impotent.’171 
 In addition, unlike Mosca and Pareto, Mills agues that elite circulation happens 
when political, economic and military institutions change. 172   Nevertheless, in the 
economic institution, economic power can be exemplified as satisfaction of material 
needs ‘through the social organization of the extraction, transformation, distribution, 
and consumption of the object of nature.’ Hence, money and product are some of 
economic power. 173  Military power can be, for instance, institutionalized physical 
defense and aggression which is about mobilizing violence (the most elementary human 
                                               
166
 Mills, The Power Elite, 275-276. 
 
167
  Ibid. 20. 
 
168
 Machiavelli, Niccolo, Prens, (Ankara: Doruk, 2000), 138.  
 
169
 Mills, The Power Elite, 21. 
 
170
 Norton, “The Power Elite by C. Wright Mills,” 171. 
 
171
 Mills, The Power Elite, 26. 
 
172
 Hess, Andreas ed., American Social and Political Thought: A Reader, (New York: New 
York University Press, 2003), 244. 
 
173
  Mann, The Sources of Social power: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760, 
24. 
 
 29 
power). 174  Lastly, political power can be explained as territorial and centralized 
regulation175 such as jurisdiction. 176   
Mills observes that even though the elites circulate and constitute three elite 
groups, they have similar social origins. 177  They have close family and personal 
relationships among themselves. They have similar education;178 and they interchange 
personnel among each other more than other social strata.179  Mills illustrates this point 
with following ideas:  
 
 The men of the higher circles are not representative men; their high position 
is not a result of moral virtue; their fabulous success is not firmly connected with 
meritorious ability. Those who sit in the seats of the high and the mighty are 
selected and formed by the means of power, the sources of wealth, and the 
mechanics of celebrity, which prevail in their society. They are not men selected 
and formed by civil service that is linked with the world of knowledge and 
sensibility.180 
  
In the US, entry of elite groups is open to anybody, at least in theory. For instance, 
every citizen has right to join the economic elites by accumulating million dollars. In 
reality, only a handful of individuals succeeded to become millionaires since the First 
World War.181 Thus, according to Mills, social mechanism is important for influencing 
society. 
 To conclude, Mills defines the power elite by saying that ‘we may define the 
power elite in terms of the mean of power- as those who occupy the command posts.’182 
The elite theories of Pareto (talented people come together somehow and create 
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prestigious groups), Michels and Mosca (in all societies, minorities rule majorities 
because they are superior and organized) are clear. They argue that the elites have some 
internal unity (special relations) which intensifies its power. However, the postwar elite 
theorist, Mills, transcends this cliché.183 That’s why it is important to talk about Mills’ 
elite theory in this thesis beside the other classical elite theorists.  
 However, ‘The Power Elite’ is unsuccessful to predict such a situation where at 
least one of the elite groups in the power elite could no longer identify its fortune or 
interest with the other groups in power elite. Let us assume that American life has not 
much changed; and for instance, military leaders still could have plans about possible 
wars.184  However, although the defense department tries to find funds for scientific 
improvements, America's economic elite give more support to other economic elites in 
various countries than their country’s military elites.185   
 
 
 1.3                                        WHO ARE ELITES?  
 
 
 According to elite theory, there is inequality of power in every society. So far, we 
have talked about classical elite theorists. According to Pareto, human beings have 
different talents. Since they have non-logical actions they tend to relate talents with 
more prestigious places in societies. These talented individuals that have prestigious 
places in societies are elites. Although they have power, the ones who rule the society 
are the governing elites. Mosca and Michels, on the other hand, have organizational 
approach: elites can rule since they are small in number and organized. Nevertheless, 
similar to Pareto, Mosca and Michels argue that elites are organized according to their 
capacities. All these classical elite theorists believe that there is only one homogeneous 
elite group at one point in time. 
In Mills theory, the elites are the ones who centralize power and information 
through institutions which are military, political and economic. Unlike the 
Machiavellians (Pareto, Mosca and Michels), in his theory there are different elite 
groups simultaneously in military, politics and economic corporations. These elites are 
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in tension. Nevertheless, they can collaborate on certain overlapping points and on 
certain time of crisis. Therefore, they form the power elites who are the rulers. 
Actually, there are various theories that try to explain power relations in 
societies. One of them is the class theory. Elite theory diverges from it. Roughly, for 
instance, in Classical Marxist Theory the dominant class members (bourgeoisie) own 
and control economic sources. Some of them are means of production and capital that 
establish bourgeoisie’s positions in the market.186 Thus, economic sources are the base 
of classes (bourgeoisie and proletariat).187 Nevertheless, they give rise to other sources 
such as political and ideological sources. Then, classes start to derive from them. 
However, the elites in the elite theory can derive from various kinds of power sources 
simultaneously. Some of them are economic and political sources.  
 Finally, according to classical elite theories, in societies there are elites who are 
different from non-elites in relation to their power and influence.188  However, these 
theories do not exhaust the field of elite theories: unlike the classical account, there are 
democratic elite theories. In these theories, it is argued that regimes matter in power 
relations in society. Democratic elite theorists claim, more specifically, that 
democracies are possible and compatible with the elite theory where the many can 
affect the decision-making process and limit power sources of elites. In the following 
chapter, I want to compare ideas of the classical and democratic elite theorists about 
power sources for becoming a part of elites and power of elites. In addition, I will 
discuss how democracy is possible and compatible for democratic elite theorists while 
classical elite theorists reject this idea. 
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                                               CHAPTER TWO 
             
                      POWER SOURCES, POWER SCOPE OF ELITES,  
                              AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DEMOCRACY  
 
 
 In this chapter I will focus on the power of elites and the ways in which 
individuals can become a part of the elites. Additionally, there is a major disagreement 
among elite theorists about the elites’ power scope and the majority’s influence in 
political decisions. Such a disagreement causes a division between elite theorists, as 
they align with democratic or classical schools of thought.189 For this reason, the second 
aim of this chapter is critically analyzing democratic elite theorists’ ideas about the 
elites, power sources and possibility of restricting elites’ power in democracies.  
 According to the elite theorists, power is dispersed throughout society unequally. 
In society, some elites have higher levels of power than other elites. An individual’s 
capacity for power depends on the specific sources (power bases) he possesses.190 Thus, 
the sources, such as talents, institutions, organizations, cause power inequality in 
societies. Although elite theorists do not necessarily make the distinction, these power 
sources can be divided into two groups: the first being the group of sources that help 
individuals to become a part of elite group and the second being the other sources that 
help elites to become more powerful and influential than other elites. This distinction 
does not mean that sources of ‘power for elites’ and ‘power of elites’ in elite theories 
are different from each other. Such a division is made only to perform a profound 
analysis and critique of power relations in a society.  
 Unlike classical elite theorists, according to the second group, different types of 
political regimes or systems impact the efficacy or power of elite groups in different 
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ways. Although democratic elite theorists believe that elites rule societies, they claim 
that democracy can restrict power of elites. Therefore, these theorists expect the 
majority to be able to influence the decision-making process. Thus, even if the ideal of 
democracy is popular sovereignty and in modern democracies this ideal might not be 
realized, democracy remains a distinctive regime due to some of its features. One of 
them is elections that limit elites’ power. 
 Thus, the importance of democracy in such elite theories does not come from 
democracy’s ability to provide equal distribution of power to rule society, but instead 
from its ability to restrain power scope of elites. As a result, for democratic elite 
theorists, democracy is compatible with elite rule. In the following, I will discuss the 
acquisition and maintenance of power in society. This issue is fundamentally important 
to discern the differences between different types of elite theory. Additionally, I will 
focus on discussions about the possibility and compatibility of democracy under elite 
rule.  
 
 
 2.1 POWER AND DEMOCRACY IN CLASSICAL ELITE THEORIES 
  
 To begin with, as Pareto states, humans differ significantly from one another since 
they are intellectually or physically dissimilar.191  These diverse masses form societies, 
which are typically ruled by elites. Pareto divides elites into two sub-categories: non-
governing and governing elites. Upon further observations of individuals’ abilities and 
capabilities, Pareto creates a ten-point scale designed to determine the rank of a certain 
individual within community in general (non-elites vs. elites) or in an elite community 
in particular (governing vs. non-governing elites). 192   Hypothetically speaking, for 
Pareto, if perfect competition were dominant in the selection of elites in a society, then 
each individual would be ranked exactly where he deserved to be, according to his 
talents and ambition.193  Thus, inequality of individual, innate gifts provides special 
advantages in different spheres of social life, like being a part of elite. For this reason, 
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talent can be interpreted as power source for becoming a part of elite in Pareto’s elite 
theory.194   
      Although Pareto assumes that these capabilities are innate, to him they can improve 
or deteriorate over time.195 This idea is related to his notion of ‘circulation of elites,’ 
which is an explanation of elite flow in society. It implicitly identifies the power source 
for elites and power of elites.196 For instance, after some governing elites died, talents of 
non-governing elites (lower rank among elites) led them to become governing elites.197 
Thus, talents are also power of elites in his elite theory. 198  Nevertheless, Pareto 
identifies specific ‘ties,’ such as the institution of aristocracy, which disturb perfect 
competition. He thinks that being a member of governing elite is given as a birthright to 
the heirs of aristocrats. Since individual characteristics are irrelevant to obtaining this 
position, but some personal ties are important; it can be argued that sometimes ties 
provide the power to become a member of an elite group.199   
 In Pareto’s elite theory, the majority is passive in the decision- making process.200 
Furthermore; he does not believe in direct democracy and thinks that the majority are 
not talented enough to rule society. Moreover, Pareto does not believe in a 
representative democracy. 201  He thinks that the democratic electorate’s belief about 
changing the incumbent party by voting is a non-logical action since the incumbent 
party might guarantee an era of endless success. 202  Thus, even in representative 
democracies ruling power belongs to elites, especially governing elites; and the majority 
cannot replace the elites by elections. Moreover, representative democracy is oxymoron, 
since ‘the parliamentary game in a democratic regime’ expresses only the private 
interests of parliamentarians but not the interests of public. For him, various individuals 
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have varied interests. Thus, neither would elites represent the society, nor could the 
society be accurately represented. 
 According to Pareto's theory, there is a democratic tendency in the ‘circulation of 
elite.’ By democratic tendency, Pareto means having free competition among 
individuals, in terms of their talents.203 As a result, democracy is not compatible with 
the theory of elites; although countries have used the title to describe their regime type. 
Thus, Pareto claims that there is no difference among various political regimes. 
 Secondly, for Mosca, elites are the individuals who are talented and organized 
within a society. The more talented groups among elites in decision-making process are 
called the ruling class.204 Similar to Pareto, according to Mosca, talent is a power source 
providing accessibility to the elite class.  Since some elites can be more influential than 
others, due to their talents; talents are also a power source of elites.205  
 Mosca agrees with Pareto and believes that elite groups can change in structure 
and composition, for instance, if their abilities lose importance.206 Moreover, similar to 
Pareto's theory, Mosca claims that being born into a ruling class is usually the quickest 
and easiest way to become a member of it.207 That is, for both Mosca and Pareto some 
‘social ties’ could provide individuals with an avenue to become elites easily.208 Lastly, 
according to Mosca, representative democracy is an illusion and majority cannot affect 
the decision-making process even by electing representatives. One reason is that since 
majority are not talented; representatives make themselves be elected by manipulating 
people’s consent. 209  However, Mosca argues that ‘reloading the ruling class with 
elements from the lower classes’ is a democratic tendency. 210  Thus, any kind of 
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democracy is not possible and not compatible with reality of elite rule. Therefore, there 
is no such distinctive regime as democracy and it cannot limit power scope of elites.211 
 There is also some credit given to power sources in Michels’ theory of the elite. 
For him, each organization is ruled by an organized minority (elites or dominant class) 
since they are talented, small in number and organized.212 For instance, according to 
Michels, some oratorical skills are needed to become a member of this minority.213 Thus, 
similar to Mosca and Pareto, Michels surmises that talents provide the power needed to 
become a member of the elite, and oratorical skill can be counted as an example of 
talents. In addition, since wealthy individuals can become elites (dominant class) more 
easily than others lacking financial resources, wealth could be interpreted as another 
power source in Michels’ theory.214  
 Additionally, in Michels’ elite theory there is the remarkable necessity of 
oligarchy.215 Nevertheless, unlike Pareto and Mosca, for Michels, ideals of democracy 
should always be followed.216  Some of these ideals are having a high degree of equality 
among all citizens and citizens’ full and constant participation in the policy-making 
process.217 These ideals of democracy can be followed by representation of citizens in 
parliament which, nonetheless, will have an oligarchic structure.218  However, these 
characteristics can guarantee societies and social movements ‘to be less oligarchic 
rather then more.’219 
 Finally, Mills argues that there are three principal elites (political, military and 
economy) which sometimes are combined to represent a cohesive group (the power 
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elite). 220  For him, these elites are the ones who centralize power and information 
through the institutions of economic, political and military rule. Thus, he stresses the 
importance of institutions; for this reason power sources of elites can be interpreted as 
economic, political or military institutions.221 However, the base power to form the 
power elite and power sources of the power elite is cooperation among economic, 
political and military elites.222 In addition to that, according to Mills, elite groups have 
similar social origins and the advantageous social mechanism is power to become a part 
of the elites.223 As a result, for Mills, talent is less important than social mechanisms 
allowing an individual to reach influential positions. 
 Mills agrees with these three classical elite theorists and claims that societies are 
ruled by elites and this is true also for democracies. By democracy, Mills means mass 
democracy. According to him, in democracies there is struggle between powerful and 
large-scale interest groups and the will of individual citizens.224 These interests groups 
are between the power elite and the majority. They are middle-level associations and 
citizens’ only link to decision-making process. However, elites rule them in terms of 
their interests and citizens cannot affect these elites. Therefore, democratic ideal such as 
representing majority or majority rule is impossible and incompatible with elite rule. 
 In summary, Pareto’s main argument about democracy is that it cannot be 
realized.225 Only a small group can govern society, and the majority will always be 
subordinate. Even though a country’s political regime seems to be democratic, 
governing elites rule majority. The same idea can be seen in Mosca’s work, Michels’ 
iron law of oligarchy226 and Mills’ power elite. On the whole, mainstream (classical) 
elite theorists from Pareto onwards have been cynical about democratic regimes.227   
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 To conclude, even if elites can circulate; classical elite theorists agree upon the 
inevitability of an elite minority in every society. This minority consists of people who 
are entitled to influence society or who have an impact on the decision-making 
process.228  Although a discussion about power sources is implicit in classical elite 
theorists’ ideas, it can be argued that for them, power sources determine the fate of 
individuals. Similar to classical elite theorists’ ideas, each democratic elite theorist has 
different explanation about power sources. However, democratic elite theorists 
challenge the view of classical elites and argue that democracies are possible under elite 
rule; and in democracies people can restrict power of elites. That is why democracy can 
be classified as a distinctive regime.         
 
2.2 A NEW APPROACH TO ELITES, POWER SOURCES AND DEMOCRACY 
 
                   
 First of all, Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950) is the originator of an elite 
conception of democracy. For him, minority is the elite ruling of society. The power to 
become one of the elites stems from individual talents.229 In this manner, he agrees with 
classical elite theorists and claims that minority rules over the majority. Moreover, 
according to Schumpeter, power for minority is due to political and cognitive abilities 
such as taking ‘purposeful responsible action’ in politics.230 
 Furthermore, in his major work ‘Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942)’ he 
thinks democracy as a political ‘method’231 which is an ‘institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means 
of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.’232 That is to say, as a result of political 
competition in elections, this method provides the ability for elite groups to take the 
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chair.233 This is Schumpeter’s response to the ‘classical’ theory of democracy by ‘which 
he means a theory of how the people could act collectively so as to be sovereign.’234 
 Additionally, Schumpeter agrees with Mills about intermediate groups and their 
position between elites and citizens in democracies. These groups (such as interest 
groups and unions) are organized and compete with one another. These intermediate 
groups, however, are also controlled by smaller elite groups. They restructure the aims 
of their organization for political consideration, but their interests are dominant in this 
respect.235 However, unlike Mills, Schumpeter believes that these small elite groups 
have to be sufficiently high quality, and perhaps possess special abilities. Thus, power 
of these elites can be interpreted as talents.236 
 Moreover, Schumpeter argues that ‘effective range of political decision should not 
be extended too far.’ This spread of power can be controlled by a general power limit 
and each individual case can and should provide some other solutions to a specific issue, 
as well.237 The general limiter, according to Schumpeter, is self control and tolerance 
for different opinions.238 For this reason, self control and tolerance are other necessary 
talents from which elites may draw power. 
 Unlike classical elite theorists, according to Schumpeter, democracy makes a 
difference in elites’ power maintenance. He thinks that power of elites is different in 
democracies since the majority has the ability to restrict, or limit, supposed power: elites 
can become a part of the ruling elite as a result of political competition where majority 
chooses ruling elites. In order to be chosen, there is competition among elites. This 
competition forces them to limit their actions to gain support from the majority. Thus, 
elites trade and obtain power from majority votes. If they have a better combination of 
policies than their elite peers, they can obtain more votes, and consequently, more 
power. In this way, they can achieve control over ‘a wider section of the political 
market.’  
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 This is Schumpeter’s minimalist democracy that has similarities with a 
representative democracy. His political system involves candidate elections, through a 
plurality or majority of votes. To be re-elected and to gain further political advantage, 
representatives offer society some civil liberties, thus restricting their own power. By 
self-limiting their power, elites compete for popular support to become more influential 
in decision-making process. 239 
 However, he uses the term ‘entrepreneur’ to describe the role of elites ‘in the 
process of political will-making.’ In democratic countries, politicians (political elites) 
are not only ‘producers’ who answer to existing demand of majority but also political 
entrepreneurs who create new demand as a result of their new policies. 240  Thus, 
Schumpeter has very pessimistic ideas about public choice by believing that 
individuals’ preferences can be manipulated by elites. Therefore, according to him, 
democratic political competition occurs where elites, especially political elites, control 
the agenda-setting. Nonetheless, Schumpeter thinks that the elites who are granted the 
authority to decide, deliberate and act in a responsible manner can become ruling 
elites.241  According to him, his minimalist view of democracy ‘would emerge only 
where there is political tolerance and a strong state.’242 
 On the one hand Schumpeter is aware of the possibility of unfair elections.243 On 
the other hand, he thinks that such a method can provide freedom, human rights or some 
other ideals to the majority but these ideals are not necessary indicators of the end of 
democracy. Thus, similar to other political regimes, democracy does not guarantee these 
ideals244 but Schumpeter claims that competitive struggle of elites for people’s vote can 
be advantageous for the majority.245 At least in principle, everyone is free to compete 
for ruling society and to present himself to voters. With this formula, Schumpeter 
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argues that even though elite minority rules the majority, democracy is possible and 
compatible with elite rule.  
 To conclude, similar to classical elite theorists, Schumpeter believes ignoring 
elites in ruling societies is not realistic. For this reason, he is an elite theorist and claims 
that these elites are political factors.246 However, for him there are differences among 
political regimes since he believes that democracy can restrict power of elites. All in all, 
like classical elite theorists, Schumpeter claims that the majority is always ruled by 
elites. According to him, in democracy the main actors of politics are not the voters, but 
the elites (political elites) who have the possibility to be voted into positions of power. 
Nonetheless, democracy is a distinctive regime thanks to its features, such as electoral 
competitions in which the majority chooses (or is forced to choose) some elites, among 
others characteristics. Thus, it can be concluded that democracy is possible and 
compatible with elite rule. 
 Another famous democratic elite theorist is Robert Dahl (1915-…). He has similar 
ideas as Schumpeter. As an elite theorists, Dahl claims that minority rules the majority 
and that there is competition among elites itself. 247  Dahl terms the majority in the 
society as ‘homo civicus.’ These individuals are citizens who are not much interested in 
political affairs. The minority is called ‘homo politicus,’ and this group has an active 
interest in politics. As a result, Dahl divides the society into two parts: apolitical and 
political. 
According to Dahl, for the second strata, homo politicus, obtaining power does 
not require any special qualifications. This means, unlike Pareto, Mosca, Michels and 
Schumpeter, for Dahl, the acquisition of power does not depend on talents. Elites have 
to be people that have interest in politics. In addition to that, power sources for 
becoming elite are mostly wealth and education.248 Dahl argues that these elites are the 
ones who are guided by their beliefs, and have more influence over political events. For 
him, beyond their direct power over events or decisions they have a fundamental role 
‘in shaping political culture and in signaling what kind of behavior is proper or 
improper.’  
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Moreover, similar to Mills and Schumpeter, Dahl thinks that there are 
intermediate level organization, such as unions or movements, between citizens and 
elites in democracies. These intermediate groups are also ruled by small elite groups. 
They have their own defined norms, beliefs and values. 249 Nevertheless, unlike classical 
elite theorists, Dahl claims that in democracies there is no concentration of power; 
therefore it is hard to understand which elites are most powerful in the decision-making 
process.  
This distinctly pluralist view is found in his work, ‘Who Governs: Democracy and 
Power in an American City.’ Thus, according to him, in every political community and 
regime, there is inequality in political resources. These resources can be interpreted as 
power of elites. However, unlike Mills or other classical elite theorists, Dahl does not 
think that in democracies political elites hold all the resources. Elites have non-
cumulative political powers.250  
Dahl calls democracies ‘polyarchy,’ which is defined as a distinctive regime with 
seven characteristics.251 One of the characteristics of polyarchy is having the right to 
seek out alternative information sources which must be protected by laws.252 Thanks to 
these characteristics; polyarchy does not necessarily provide equality of the power share, 
but offers non-centralization of power.253As a result, elites would have limited power. 
Additionally, similar to Schumpeter, he talks about elections and elite competition in 
democracies. 254  According to him, these institutions are sufficient to guarantee 
pluralism255 which is important for polyarchy.  
Dahl argues that polyarchy is essentially the base of modern democracy. 256 
Polyarchic societies are industrial societies. Individual interests are diverse and power is 
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dispersed throughout them. 257  However, Dahl refuses to think that departing from 
equality necessarily causes one group to dominate over another. He argues that this is 
not true and there can be ‘inequality, greater inequality, and lesser inequality.’258 Thus, 
Dahl agrees with classical elite theorists and claims that having equal share of ruling 
power throughout the society (as well as popular sovereignty) is a Utopia.259   Moreover, 
self-governance in a complex, crowded modern society is difficult.260  However, unlike 
classical elite theorists, Dahl believes that democracy is possible to be realized.261  
Finally, according to Dahl, countries can be classified ‘according to the extent to 
which their political institutions approximate these criteria.’ The major institutions of 
government are the chief executive, the bureaucracies, the parliament, and the judiciary 
branch. These institutions are independent one another and ruled by elites. 262  
Nevertheless, he thinks that political parties could make it impossible for citizens ‘to 
coordinate their efforts in order to nominate and elect their preferred candidates and 
thus would violate the criteria of voting equality and effective participation.’ However, 
he still argues that his theory of pluralist democracy is possible under elite rule.263 
Last in the list of democratic elite theorists is Giovanni Sartori (1924-…). 
According to him, the minority rules the majority. However, Sartori chooses to focus 
mainly on the position of elites in democracies. Similar to Dahl, Sartori believes in the 
pluralism of elites in democracies. Unlike other political regimes, in democracies there 
is no concentration of power but instead a ‘multiplicity of crisscrossing power groups 
engaged in a coalition maneuvering.’ Sartori attributes this multiplicity of power to the 
diffused power inequality. 
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 In this manner, he criticizes classical elite theorists. For instance, Mosca assumes 
that there is one ruling class which holds the necessary sources for power of elites.264 
However, according to Sartori, various elites intersect one another to rule society 
through reconciliation strategies. The reconciliation strategies can be experienced in the 
election period, in which elites promise benefits and advantages to their followers. The 
reason is that elites want to lead and influence the society, which is complex and 
multifaceted due to the diversity of the power inequality.  
 Sometimes the elites try to be elected alone and sometimes they try to build 
winning coalitions.265 In this way, the elites compete for supporters, since their power 
comes ‘from the numbers that follow them.’ Therefore, followers can be interpreted as 
the power sources of elites. However, after obtaining support of the followers, elites 
should act responsibly, in order to retain their following. Thus, unlike Schumpeter, 
Sartori argues that although the majority might not have the knowledge for governing, 
they could have opinions that allow them to make retrospective judgments about the 
outcome of government policy. Therefore, they cannot be manipulated, as Schumpeter 
argues. Moreover, opinions of majority will be reflected on votes. By knowing this 
reality, representatives will try to act more responsible to the society and they cannot 
follow only their interests.266   
 For example, political elites need support of the electorate, since the electorate can 
expel them in the next election. 267   For this reason, these elites will try to make 
decisions that are advantageous to the electorate. As a result, they can be elected and 
remain in power, by restricting their own power scope. This means, democracy prevents 
elites from doing just whatever they want and provides a watchful majority to influence 
decision-making processes. This is similar to Dahl's electoral polyarchy. However, for 
Sartori there is more reciprocal control of elites upon elites in democracies. Moreover, 
unlike apolitical people in Dahl’s theory, Sartori argues that majority must ‘retrain, 
control and influence elites for their full and unfettered power.’ As a result, for him 
democracy is a procedure or a mechanism that creates an open polyarchy. In this 
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polyarcy, elite competition on the electoral market, limited power of the people and 
responsive elites are possible.268    
All in all, for Sartori, democracy is a form of government269 which is possible to 
be realized and which is compatible with elite rule. He explains his ideas by ‘decision-
making theory of democracy.’ As it was stated, this theory is about how various elites’ 
power intersects one another through reconciliation strategies. 270  Sartori especially 
criticizes Mosca, Michels and Pareto and thinks that ‘reality does not contradict with 
democracy.’271 For instance, he claims that Michels is wrong about his critiques of 
democracy. According to him, Michels’ field observation is too limited since he only 
observes German Social Democratic Party.272 Sartori concludes that it is possible to 
have a practical democracy which depends upon a judicious mix of political 
participation and cautious government of elites. 
To conclude, democratic elite theorists accept elites’ rule. For instance, Sartori 
and Schumpeter agree with Pareto, Mosca and Michels. All of them claim that elites 
need specialized competency for ruling society. 273  However, for democratic elite 
theorists, powers of elites are limited in democracies. For instance, according to 
Schumpeter and Sartori, the function of electoral competition is to decide on and 
legitimize elites who will rule the society. For this reason, elites will make some 
promises in order to be elected and will offer their constituents some benefits in order to 
be re-elected. However, a government that derives its authority from public opinion will 
still be influenced by its ruling elites even more than being influenced by the 
majority.274  
Thus, similar to classical elite theorists, democratic elite theorists argue that elites 
are influential group in the decision-making process. However, unlike classical elite 
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theorists, for democratic elite theorists, the majority can retain some degree of power 
and influence in democracies. Therefore, they argue that democracy is a distinctive 
regime since any real source for the power acquisition of elites might be restricted by 
democracy. Thus, due to the arrangement of democracy, elites’ power is not absolute, 
but instead relative. Last but not least, for classical elite theorists, the idea of democracy 
is neither possible to consider, nor compatible with the ‘reality of elite rule.’ 275 
Moreover, they argue that all political regimes are the same. However, democratic elite 
theorists, who question the relation between political regime and elites, insist that 
democracy is compatible with the theory of elites.  
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                                                  CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 According to the elite theory, certain groups have a dominant role in the politics 
of societies. Thus, they have more power and prestige than the rest. In the elite theory 
these are called ‘elites’. Elites are the minority which rules the majority. Accordingly, 
elite theories divide societies into two groups: the majority and the minority. However, 
these theories can be categorized according to their focus. In this thesis they were 
separated into two kinds: Elite theories (Pareto, Mosca, Michels and Wright Mills) in 
which political regimes have almost no difference among them and cannot limit power 
of elites vs. Elite theories (Sartori, Dahl and Schumpeter) in which democracy is 
accepted as a distinctive political regime which is possible under elite rule and can limit 
the power of elites. In the literature, elite theories are divided into classical elite 
theorists vs. democratic elite theorists.  
 In this thesis, firstly the classical group and their ideas about elites were critically 
analyzed. The second aim of the thesis was to discuss how individuals can become a 
part of the elite; and which power sources help elites to become more powerful among 
elites. For this aim, power sources were categorized. Finally, how democracy is possible 
to be realized and how it can limit elites’ power were questioned. For this reason, while 
elite perception of democratic elite theorists was discussed, classical and democratic 
elite theories were compared and critically analyzed.  
 Both groups have some similarities about elites and elites’ power; although their 
ideas about power sources are mostly different. For the second group, democracy as a 
distinctive way of government is perfectly compatible with elite rule. Thus, it is possible 
to have elite rule with a limited power scope. On the contrary, for the first group, the 
power scope of elites cannot be restricted by democracy and there is no difference 
among different political regimes.  
  To sum up, this thesis is a theoretical discussion of elites. While elite theories 
were analyzed, the question of elites was critically discussed. This discussion let the 
 48 
thesis to ask how individuals become a member of the elite and what the elite powers 
are. It is important to study whether elites’ power can be restricted and whether 
democracy is possible under the shadow of elites. Thus, chapter one was designed so as 
to provide a general overview of the elites according to the classical elite theories. 
Chapter two provided the basic discussion about the elites’ power sources and the 
power sources that individuals need to become members of the elite. Moreover, in the 
second chapter, the democratic group’s elite theories were critically analyzed; and the 
elite power scope and the possibility of a democratic form of government were 
discussed. The importance of this thesis stemmed from its contribution to an 
opportunity to expand the elite discussion which is crucial for contemporary 
deliberations about democracy. 
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